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An Examination of IPO Performance in Canada’s Manufacturing Industry 





This paper investigates the IPO price performance of Canada’s manufacturing 
firms. We examine the theory and evidence on IPO activities: in the manufacturing 
sector based on first day of trading, and the long run IPO performance with respect to 
different benchmarks. The result shows that IPOs are underpriced in the initial issue 
period. However, the IPO performance which relative to S&P/TSX composite index 
confirms that it is overpriced in the long run, while the performance which relative to 
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The initial public offerings (IPOs) of firm’s common stock can be commonly 
referred to as security is sold to the general public for the first time. Usually the 
security can be of any debt or equity, but this paper will mainly focus on the equity 
aspect.  
From decades ago, thousands of companies have gone public over the world. 
Previous empirical research found that the major concern with pricing of IPOs is 
significantly underpricing, which means the closing price of a new issued stock at the 
first trading day is often higher than the offer price. Some scholars pointed out in their 
researches that IPOs are often underpriced may be caused by the liquidity and 
uncertainty of the level at which the security will trade. The less liquid and less 
predictable the shares are, the more underpriced they will have to be in order to 
compensate investors for the risk they are taking. Because an IPO's issuer tends to 
know more about the value of the shares than the investor, a company must underprice 
its stock to encourage investors to participate in the IPO. 
Numerous studies show that three major anomalies in the pricing of IPOs of 
common stock: (1) the (short-run) underpricing, (2) the “hot issue” market, and (3) the 






The Canadian manufacturing sector covers 21 industry groups that produce 
goods for both industrial and consumer use. The manufacturing sector’s activity is 
monitored monthly and annually, as it accounts for a large part of Canada’s Gross 
Domestic Product. However, recently news shows that (David Parkinson, June 14, 
2013): 
“The manufacturing sector remains the weak link in Canada’s economy, and the 
latest monthly report from the beleaguered industry suggests the clouds are far from 
parting: Manufacturing sales slumped 2.4 per cent on a seasonally adjusted basis in 
April, the biggest drop since August, 2009. It was the fourth decline in five months; 
the sector hasn’t shown any discernible growth in the better part of two years.” 
Manufacture has a vital role in Canada’s economy. In addition, because of the 
situation that manufacturing industry declined for years, people may wonder whether 
manufacture industry IPOs have a negative influence on the Canadian IPOs average 
return. Therefore, the paper will devote to examining the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon for 3 years after the issue day. It will try to figure out if there is 
relationship among severities of IPO performance, the manufacturing industry, and 
IPOs return in Canada. 
 
1.2 Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this paper is mainly focus on how IPOs price performance in the 
long run in manufacturing industry. Compare with the short-term IPOs performance, 
evaluating the long-term performance of IPOs in a specific industry to see whether 
there is any featured characteristic in a special industry in Canada and whether it 






This paper examines the short-term and long-term performance of IPOs in 
Canada manufacture industry. However, the industrial classification is not so clearly 
when we search for the data sources. We uses firms under “industrial” and “materiel” 
category, which also meet our study purposes that to find out the manufacture industry 
specification in IPO market since the material is also an important part of the 
manufacture industry. In addition, due to the data limitation, we cannot adjust IPOs 
return by different benchmarks and also the matching firms' return. The last limitation 
is that we only exam the manufacture industry in this paper, so we do not have enough 
information to compare with other industries so that to see if there is any industrial 
specification characteristics. 
 
1.4 Structure of this paper 
The structure of this paper is arranged as follows: Chapter 1 is focus on the 
background of IPOs, some data, and main purpose of this study. The next chapter will 
overview the literatures and provides some ideas related to this topic. Chapter 3 
presents the details of this study methodology and data resources. Chapter 4 provides 
the result of empirical analysis. Chapter 5, the final one, will give the summary and 








2.1 Rise of IPOs 
When a firm considering raise finance from public, the first choice comes into 
their mind is IPO. IPO firms principally came into the market after 1970, but only a 
few firms took IPO process in a sample of 682 IPO firms found only twelve IPOs that 
were issued before 1980 (Jain and Kini, 1994). Industry professionals offer many 
reasons why private firm want to go public. IPO can be used to raise capital for 
expansion of the firm, increase liquidity for the shareholders, and improve reputation 
of the firm and to create valuable currency which indicates the stock (Draho, J., 2004). 
As Tim Jenkinson (Jenkinson, T., & Ljungqvist, A., 1996) stated, whether to go 
public is an important decision in the life cycle of a firm. In this case, IPO is a main 
approach to sell their shares to investors. 
 
2.2 Underpricing of IPOs 
"Pricing an IPO is always a function of the valuation," says Charles J. Kaplan, 
president of Equity Analytics. "That's what you have to determine first."  
As showed in data, over three years, the average IPO underperformed the CRSP 
value-weighted market index by 23.4 percent from 1980 to 2001 (Ritter J., 2002). In 
addition, the degree of underpricing was changing severely over the time. It showed 
that the average first-day return on IPOs was 7% in the 1980s, while the average first-
day return doubled to almost 15% during 1990 to 1998. Especially during the “dot-




return (Tim L. & Ritter J., 2004).  Underpricing of IPOs seems to become a common 
phenomenon when firms become public for the first time. One rational behind IPO 
underpricing could be attributed by asymmetric information. Rock (1986) wrote in his 
article that there are two types of investors existing in the market: one is informed 
investor, and the other one is uninformed investor. It is said that informed investor 
may acknowledge more information about a security or a firm’s intrinsic value, and 
they would invest only in underpriced securities to get more profit. Uninformed 
investors who only have public information, on the contrary, will bid on both 
underpriced and overpriced securities as they do not know the intrinsic value of each 
security. Thus, underwriters often underprice the IPOs to keep those uninformed 
investors participation in the market. 
 
2.2.1 Short run under-performance  
In terms of short-term performance in IPOs, the IPOs showed significant positive 
average first-day return. The underpricing of IPOs could vary from country to country 
and it is an essential for a company's life circle. . In the UK, Dimson (1979), Buckland 
et al. (1981), and Levis (1993) indicate average first day returns ranging from 8.5% to 
17%. Internationally, Loughran et al. (1994) showed significant underpricing for 28 
countries. Loughran et al. (1994) showed that average initial return can be only 4.2% 
for French IPOs and surprisingly high, 80%, for Malaysian IPOs. Several studies 
concluded that, on average, short-run returns are less positive for those IPOs that are 
brought to the market by more prestigious underwriters n (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; 
Johnson and Miller, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990; Booth and Chua, 1996; Nanda 





2.2.2 Long run under-performance puzzle 
Statistics showed that IPOs underperformed in the long run (Ritter, 1991; 
Longhran & Ritter, 1995; Ritter & Welch, 2002). During 1975 to 1984, every dollar 
invested in a portfolio of IPOs which purchased at the closing price on the first trading 
day would have a terminal wealth of $1.3447 after buy-and-hold for three years, while 
every dollar in the matching firm would result in $1.6186 (Ritter, 1991).  
However, conversely, Brav and Gompers (1997) investigated the long-run 
underperformance of IPO firms for both nonventure-backed IPOs and venture-backed 
IPOs using equal-weighted return. They found that venture-backed IPOs did not 
significantly underperformed while the smallest nonventure-backed IPOs did. 
There are much more articles published academic studies to examine the 
performance of IPOs. Stoll and Curley (1970) found that in the short run, the stocks in 
the sample of 205 small offers showed a high price appreciation. Conversely, in the 
long run, the small firms seemed operate not so well. Ritter (1991) believed that 
possible explanations for this poor performance maybe caused by: first, risk 
mismeasurement; second, bad luck; or third, fads and overoptimism. In addition, IPOs 
in Finland, Germany, Spain and South Africa have experienced unsatisfying long-run 
performance, as in the USA (Lee et al., 1996; Keloharju, 1993; Ljungqvist, 1997; 
Alvarez and Gonzalez, 2005; Page and Reyneke, 1997). The long-run performance of 
IPOs is considered as a puzzle.  
On the other hand, IPOs in emerging markets such as Malaysia and Thailand 
have been shown that in the long run they outperforming the market (Corhay et al., 
2002; Allen et al., 1999).  
In conclusion, in the long term view, the performance of IPOs remains 




different from that the large ones. When referring to the rationale behind this, Ritter 
gave three most detail explanations based on the research of Shiller (1990) which 
conduct a test on “fad” explanations. 
 
2.3 Market efficiency hypotheses  
The performance theory, especially in terms of long run performance, was based 
on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). It is assumed that the market is efficient 
which refers to the stock prices adjusted to new information released into the market 
immediately and accurate. The stock price should reflect all information available in 
the market (Fama, 1970). Bossaerts and Bondarenko (2000) derived a weak form of 
market efficiency and named it “Efficiently Learning Market (ELM)”.  This ELM 
seemed to be a reasonable rational behind IPO market. Bossaerts and Hillion (2001) 
presented that under the ELM, the IPO long-run anomalies are no longer observed. 
They noticed that if investors could efficiently learn from the market, the IPO long-
run underperformance in the USA was no longer exists. However, one main problem 
of this ELM theory is that how could an investor learn from the market efficiently? 
 
2.4 Information asymmetry hypotheses 
One of the best-known rational behind IPO underpricing is perhaps the 
asymmetric information. Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse about informed investors and 
uninformed investors should be the most convincing and reasonable model of 
asymmetric information. 
Furthermore, many researches have been done after Rock. Beaty and Ritter (1986) 




out that the higher uncertainty about an IPO, the greater that investors would cost to 
access the information, and the discount rate of the IPO would go up. Researches showed 
that most countries support this extended theory on this assumption in this view. 
Therefore, it becomes one of the most definite explanations in IPOs discount theories. 
Beatty and Ritter also raised an interesting text: an investor who wants to engage in 
information production implicitly invests in a call option on the IPO. When she/he thinks 
the 'true' price (the offering price of this IPO) exceeds the strike price, she/he will exercise 
this call option. When the value of this call option increases in the extent of uncertainty, 
more investors will become informed. Thus, the necessary of underpricing is required, 
and then if enough investors become informed, the winner's curse would presumably 
disappear. 
 
2.5 Agency theory 
When a firm goes public, they need an agency act on their behalf to help them apply 
and determine price. Thus, when an agency involved in, the cost of agency and the 
reputation of the underwriter must be considered. Agency theory is concerned with 
resolving problems that can exist in agency relationships; that is, between principals 
(such as shareholders) and agents of the principals (the underwriters). The two 
problems that agency theory addresses are:  
1) The problems that arise when the desires or goals of the principal and agent 
are in conflict, and the principal is unable to verify (because it difficult and/or 
expensive to do so) what the agent is actually doing;  
2) The problems that arise when the principal and agent have different attitudes 
towards risk. Because of different risk tolerances, the principal and agent may each be 




Jensen and Meckling (1976) thought the total agency cost was made of three 
proportions, which were investors’ monitor cost, residual loss and management fee. 
Baron (1982) put forward the agency theory, as the underwriters of investment 
banking with information about the capital markets and distribution pricing. The goal 
of a firm to go public is to raise more capital, while underwriters need to maximize the 
underwriting fees and depress the issuing price. When the issuer is difficult to monitor 
the behaviour of the agent, they could improve the success rate of underwriting 
activities by IPO underpricing.  
Furthermore, after a further study about the relationship between agency 
(underwriters or investment institution), Loughran and Ritter (2002) believed that 
underwriters may intend to lower the price so that they could sell those shares to their 






Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 Data source 
The sample data of this paper is comprised of 571 initial public offerings from 
January 1
st
, 1999 to December 30
th
, 2009 meeting following criteria:  
1) All of the IPO firms are listed in the exchange of Canada during the period of 
1999 to 2009, 
2) Each sample firm should have the details about IPO, e.g., offering price, 
offering data, closing price of first trading day, and at least 1 year stock price after 
IPO, 
3) An offer price of CAD 1.00 per share of more, 
4) Industry classification in Bloomberg: industrial and material, 
5) The offering involved equity stocks only 
In order to achieve the objective of this study we select data which specifics of 
each offering firms including the offering date, the volume of IPO issued, the offering 
price, firm size,  the first-day closed stock price and average monthly stock price after 
IPO. All of the information can be easily found in Bloomberg and S&P Capital IQ. 
According to the standards and data available for study, the actual number of 







The table below shows that IPOs have underperformed other firms of the same 
size (market capitalization) by an average of 3.3% per year during the five years after 
issuing, and not including the first-day return. The underperformance relative to other 
firms of the same size and book-to-market ratio has average 1.8% per year. This 
evidence indicates that the aftermarket performance is also underperformance as the 
short-term performance. The short run underperformance has been studied in details 
in many researches. In this paper, thus, the long-term performance of IPOs will be 
mainly focused on. 
Sources: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2012-5years.pdf 
 
As the following table, it includes 25 original countries which show the long run 
average return of each country. The evidence shows that among all the developed 
countries, IPOs return in Canada is obviously lower than any others. Canada is said to 
be the one of the strongest western countries and have good relationship with the 
United States. In 2008, almost all the developed countries suffered from the financial 














3.2.1 Short run performance of IPOs 
There are three formulas can be applied to determine the performance of IPOs in 
the short run. 
1) Degree of underpricing 
                  
where     is the closing price of stock i in the first trading day 
                 is the offering price of stock i 
 




for a short period to examine the short run performance. The equation is defined as 
follow: 
    
       
   
 
 
where     is the average of closing price of stock i after IPO, n is observed days 
                 is the offering price of stock i 
 
3) Net degree of underpricing. This method eliminates the effect of market 
overall revenue level from initial rate of return. 
     
       
   
 
       
   
 
   where     is the closing price of stock I in the first trading day 
             is the IPO offering price 
             is the closing S&P/TSX index in the first trading day of stock i 
             is the last trading day's closing index of S&P/TSX before IPO of stock i 
If ADUP>0, it means this security is underpricing 
If ADUP<0, it means this security is overpricing 
If ADUP=-0, it means this security is correct priced 
 
In this paper, formula 3 will be used. Using similar formula can eliminate the 
effect of market overall revenue level from initial rate of return. Furthermore, as we 
need to compare the short run and long run IPOs performance, using same formula 
would be appropriate for us to see the difference and be more convincing. 
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where AR is the abnormal return, n is the sample size 
If AR>0, the sample firm we examined are underpricing in the short run 
If AR<0, the sample firm we examined are overpricing in the short run 
If AR=0, the sample firm we examined are fairly priced in the short run 
 
3.2.2 Long run performance 
To evaluate the long-run performance of IPOs, two methods are used as follow: 
1) Cumulative average adjusted returns (CAR) calculated with the monthly 
return after issue-day 
The benchmark-adjusted return for stock   in event month   is defined as: 
             
 
where    is the return of stock i in the month t 
    is the market return in the month t 
The average benchmark-adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event 
month t is the equally weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-adjusted returns: 
    
 
 
∑    
 
   
 
The cumulative benchmark-adjusted aftermarket performance from event month 
q to event month s is the summation of the average benchmark-adjusted returns. 
       ∑   
 





If CAR>0, it means the sample firm is underpricing in the long run 
If CAR<0, it means the sample firm is overpricing in the long run 
For those firms who were delisted within 3 years, the return for both IPO and the 
benchmark only includes the days from the start of the month until the delisting day. 
 
(2) 3-year buy and hold returns for both the IPOs and peer firms. 
As the above formulas adjust the market return, which implicitly assumes 
monthly portfolio rebalancing, the 3-year buy-and-hold method can simply indicate 
the return of the stock without rebalancing. 
Using formula to compute 3-year holding period returns: 
   ∏       
  
   
 
where     is the raw return on firm i in event month t. 
To interpret this 3-year total return, compute wealth relatives (WR) as a 
performance measure: 
   
                                     
                                              
 
 
If WR>1, it is interpreted as IPOs outperforming a portfolio of matching firms 






Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Summary of data 
Table 4.1 shows the summary of the data. From the table, we can see the sample 
firms issued their IPOs in Canada from 1999 to 2009. In 2004 and 2007, there were 17 
and 16 manufacture firms who issued IPOs in Canada. From the mean dollars per 
issue of each IPO, we can say that the more IPOs issued every year and the more 
average offer size per issue, the market is more “hot”. The table indicates that in 2002 
and 2004, IPOs offered a larger size than any other years.  
Table 4.1 Distribution of Manufacturing IPOs, 1999 to 2009 
 
Year Number of IPOs 
Total Issued  
(CAD millions) 
Mean per issue 
(CAD million) 
1999 4 452.2 113.05 
2000 4 109.38966 27.237415 
2001 2 132.668 66.334 
2002 11 6550.20191 595.4729 
2003 2 15.325 7.6625 
2004 17 7038.72016 414.0424 
2005 11 905.55605 82.323277 
2006 13 653.4503 50.2654 
2007 16 1934.2275 120.88922 




4.2 Results and Analysis of short run IPOs 
Table 4.2 shows the adjusted degree of underpricing for the sample stock in the 
IPO first trading day. Here we used the closing price on the first trading day of each 
stock to calculate the first day return and used S&P/TSX Composite as a benchmark 
to adjust the return. From the table we can see that the many ADUPs of firms are 
larger than zero, which mean that the IPOs of those firms were underpriced. The 
average abnormal return is 0.009893563, which is a little bit higher than zero and 
means the sample firms of Canadian manufacturing industry are underpriced in the 
initial public offering day. However, the result indicates that the underpriced of those 
sample firms is not significant. This may probably have following rational 
1) Underwriter price support plays a significant role, which assumes that a 
deliberate decision is made by either the issuer or the underwriter to set 
the price below the true expected market value. 
2) Based on previous study, it showed that small offering size firms’ IPOs 
were less underpriced than those large offering size firms. In this paper, 
less than 25 percent of the total samples are large offering firms. Thus, 
the small offering size may attribute to this insignificant under-pricing. 
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ATS-U CN -0.014395 FCC CN -0.061090 NIF-U CN -0.001134 VNP CN 0.865383 
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XOR CN -1.003398 XTX CN 0.007849 
    
*AR= 0.009893563 
 
4.3 Results and Analysis of long run performance 
 4.3.1 Using S&P/TSX Composite Index 




IPOs of Canada manufacturing industry. Thus, I divided 3 years into 36 periods and in 
each period the benchmark-adjusted abnormal return is showed as follow Table 4.3 
Table 4.3.1 S&P/TSX Composite Index adjusted return of sample firm in each 
period 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 AR5 AR6 AR7 AR8 AR9 AR10 AR11 AR12 
-0.00926 -0.01456 0.014064 -0.00466 -0.01827 -0.02477 0.005045 0.004284 -0.01293 -0.01353 -0.01061 -0.01577 
AR13 AR14 AR15 AR16 AR17 AR18 AR19 AR20 AR21 AR22 AR23 AR24 
0.019668 0.024942 -0.03130 0.004254 -0.00077 0.023176 0.025442 -0.00400 -0.02893 0.015414 0.011456 -0.00450 
AR25 AR26 AR27 AR28 AR29 AR30 AR31 AR32 AR33 AR34 AR35 AR36 
0.017332 0.009517 -0.02101 -0.00362 0.027276 0.008394 -0.02012 0.009351 -0.03541 -0.03357 -0.00950 -0.83651 
CAR= - 0.933969359 
  
As we can see from the table, most abnormal returns are negative, and the 
cumulative benchmark-adjusted return is -0.933969359. The negative sign means the 
manufacture firms’ IPOs between 1999 and 2009 are overpriced in the long run. Ritter 
(1991) said in his article that there are several reasons which make the IPOs long-run 
performance overpricing: first, the existence of price patterns may create opportunities 
for those investors to generate excess returns by using active trading strategies; second, 
researchers want to find out the market timing abilities of the issuers by looking for 
the relationship between the high volume of the IPOs and its long-run performance, 
since some founding indicates that the volume of IPOs change significantly over time. 
 
4.3.2 Using Dow Jones Industrial Average Index 
Dow Jones Industrial Average is a popular index which is widely used by many 
financial specialists to calculate the return, beta, and some other financial information. 
Here, in this paper, I use this index, whose prices have already changed into Canadian 
dollars, to examine the Canada manufacturing IPOs’ return. The following table 





Table 4.3.2 Dow Jones Industrial Average Index adjusted abnormal return 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 AR5 AR6 AR7 AR8 AR9 AR10 AR11 AR12 
1.935672 2.298447 -0.11603 0.649152 0.553939 0.828605 6.075368 1.51272 0.479997 1.439326 1.383525 4.081713 
AR13 AR14 AR15 AR16 AR17 AR18 AR19 AR20 AR21 AR22 AR23 AR24 
2.419663 2.029223 1.082763 2.693687 2.703046 2.578921 1.526522 1.124131 1.496392 0.905798 2.464912 0.920047 
AR25 AR26 AR27 AR28 AR29 AR30 AR31 AR32 AR33 AR34 AR35 AR36 
1.189286 0.848998 2.681254 1.79966 1.679063 2.555679 2.06978 3.398384 1.851647 2.36354 4.127777 1.062448 
CAR=1.90819595161476 
 
As we can see from this table, the abnormal return is positive for every firm and 
some are even more than 2.00. Also, the cumulative abnormal return is approximately 
1.908, which is opposite to the S&P/TSX composite index adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return. It means that the Canada manufacturing IPOs underperformance 
over the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the long term. Why this situation happens? 
This could be the following reasons: 
1) S&P/TSX composite index includes almost all the industry in Canada, 
while the Dow Jones industrial average has industry specification for the 
industrial firms. When compare with Dow Jones, the manufacture IPOs 
return may be more convincing 
2) Using Dow Jones average as a benchmark may tend to bias the results in 
favour of the return in different countries. But still, we cannot tell which 
index is more reliable. 
4.3.3 Buy-and-hold Method 
The buy-and-hold method calculated the wealth relative. Compare with the 
matching firms (see details in appendix D) return, the results are showed below.  
Table 4.3.3 Buy-and-Hold compares differences between IPO firms’ return 









firm number IPO return matching firm return WR 
1.00-20.00 7 191 -0.005553529 0.069384583 0.929924077 
20.00-50.00 13 132 -0.013923898 0.072571478 0.919357006 
50.00-100.00 19 61 -0.032906976 0.057219907 0.914751053 
>100.00 47 157 -0.042665772 0.046942054 0.914409947 
All (mean)   -0.023762544 0.061529505 0.919610521 
 
We can know from above table that wealth relative is less than 1.00, which can 
be interpreted as IPOs is underperforming a portfolio of peer firms. In some respects, 
the findings that there is a tendency for the firms with higher market capitalization 
perform worse than small firms. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) have presented 
evidence that, for those small capitalization stocks, there is a negative relation 
between past and subsequent abnormal returns on individual securities using holding 






Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to examine the IPO performance of Canada’s 
manufacturing industry is underpriced, overpriced or correctly priced. After providing 
an empirical research for manufacture firms in Canada, the result shows differently 
from short run and long run. In the short run, the average abnormal return is 
0.009893563 for selected samples in the initial issue period, which means underpriced 
for those firms but not significantly. It is consistent with the previous theory. In the 
long run, using two benchmarks in this paper, one is S&P/TSX  Composite index 
which shows the overprice for selected samples, while the other one is Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index which shows the underprice among those firms. Due to the 
factor of industrial specification, Dow Jones index may be more convincing. In 
addition, the result of buy and hold model also shows that the existence of 
underpricing. We use 3-year monthly return for each firm, thus, the mispricing still 
exists. However, IPOs should be neither underpriced or overpriced afterwards 
regarding to the efficient market hypotheses.  
5.2 Recommendations 
There is no index of specific industry in Canada, for example, industrial index. 
Therefore, we could not say the Dow Jones industrial average index is a pretty 
appropriate benchmark for this study. Although buy and hold method using the 
matching firm’s return as a standard to calculate the degree of mispricing, rebalancing 
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Appendix A     





Initial Pub Offer 
 (Shares Offered) 
XTX CN Xantrex Technology Inc 3/19/2004 67.05 18 3725000 
XOR CN X-Ore Resources Inc 12/20/2002 0.996 1000 996 
XBC CN Xebec Adsorption Inc 12/21/2004 15.05 1.75 8600000 
WPX CN Western Potash Corp 5/6/2008 23.0032 1.1 18185000 
WMK/H CN Whitemud Resources Inc 2/28/2007 52.4 8 6250000 
WM CN Wallbridge Mining Co Ltd 7/25/2000 8.73966 1.5 5826440 
VNP CN 5N Plus Inc 12/20/2007 66.5154 3 20671800 
UWE CN U308 Corp 12/28/2006 30.25 2.5 11000000 
TVK CN TerraVest Capital Inc 7/9/2004 28.0767 8.15 3255000 
TSL CN Tree Island Steel Ltd 11/12/2002 164.388 10 16438800 
TRK-U CN Canada Cartage Diversified Inc 3/13/2006 124.19 10 11827600 
TMA CN Trimac Transportation Ltd 2/25/2005 90.2851 10 8598590 
TL CN Teal Exploration & Mining Inc 11/15/2005 0.42525 2.25 17800000 
TFI CN TransForce Inc 9/30/2002 117.3 8.5 12000000 
TBG CN Terrabiogen Technologies Inc 2/8/1999 4.95 2.25 2200000 
SXP CN Supremex Inc 3/31/2006 200 10 17500000 
SDC CN Seacliff Construction Corp 4/24/2008 100 13 7692310 
SCM CN Sacre-Coeur Minerals Ltd 11/7/2005 13.2 1.5 8800000 
SBR CN Silver Bear Resources Inc 12/19/2007 32.1 3 10000000 
RME CN Rocky Mountain Dealerships Inc 12/20/2007 74.75 10 6500000 
QUX CN KGHM International Ltd 4/8/2004 144.936 6 24156000 
PLS CN Polaris Minerals Corp 1/9/2006 79.8153 4.8 15628200 
PKL CN PC Gold Inc 5/13/2008 11.5 1 10000000 
PBB-U CN PBB Global Logistics Income Fu 5/15/2002 45 10 4500000 
OPM CN Opta Minerals Inc 2/17/2005 19.8 4 4500000 
OGD CN Orbit Garant Drilling Inc 6/26/2008 60 4 15000000 
OFB-U CN OFI Income Fund 9/1/2005 129.626 10 11784200 
NIF-U CN Noranda Income Fund 5/3/2002 250.5 10 22500000 
ND CN New Dawn Mining Corp 6/13/2008 6.4224 1.8 3334000 
NCF-U CN Norcast Income Fund 6/22/2005 77.025 10 7702500 
MUN CN Mundoro Capital Inc 11/25/2003 11.875 1.25 9500000 
MTP CN Motapa Diamonds Inc 8/17/2004 6 1.25 4800000 
MTO CN Metanor Resources Inc 12/11/2003 3.45 1 3000000 
MSV CN Minco Silver Corp 12/1/2005 1.15 1.25 800000 
MCH CN Mecachrome International Inc 10/12/2007 205.625 14 14687500 
LIV-U CN Livingston International Incom 2/11/2002 151.03 10 15103000 
LH CN Lockerbie & Hole Inc 8/8/2007 150.88 10.25 12800000 
INV CN INV Metals Inc 3/17/2006 25.344 1.2 18500000 
IBG CN IBI Group Inc 8/31/2004 50.258 10 4800000 
HNZ/A CN HNZ Group Inc 9/9/2005 100.78 10 10078000 
GWW/H CN Genesis Worldwide Inc/Canada 7/3/2007 23 2 10000000 





Gienow Windows & Doors 
Income 10/19/2004 165 10 16500000 
GDI CN General Donlee Canada Inc 5/3/2002 89.47 10 7780000 
GBY-U CN Granby Industries Income Fund 12/16/2004 73.7564 10 7375640 
FTP CN Fortress Paper Ltd 6/28/2007 46 8 5000000 
FNV CN Franco-Nevada Corp 12/3/2007 1258.56 15.2 72000000 
FMA/H CN First Metals Inc 9/1/2006 4.0419 1.1 3674460 
FCC CN Frontera Copper Corp 12/9/2004 60 2 30000000 
FBK CN Fibrek Inc 8/1/2002 444.375 10 41475000 
DRX CN ADF Group Inc 7/21/1999 34.5 8 4312500 
DPI-U CN Drive Products Income Fund 8/25/2006 76.214 10 7000000 
DNK CN Dynetek Industries Ltd 9/21/2000 40 7.5 5333330 
DGC CN Detour Gold Corp 1/31/2007 35 3.5 10000000 
DFE CN 0944460 BC Ltd 12/6/2007 100.05 7.25 13800000 
CUS CN Canexus Corp 8/18/2005 317.5 10 30000000 
CUM CN Copper Mountain Mining Corp 6/29/2007 2.0125 1.75 1000000 
CSS CN Contrans Group Inc 7/23/2002 54.0312 9.5 5050000 
COP CN Coro Mining Corp 7/10/2007 13.5 2.25 6000000 
CMJ CN Colombian Mines Corp 4/2/2008 1 1 1000000 
CJT CN Cargojet Inc 6/9/2005 62.5227 10 5954540 
CHE-U CN Chemtrade Logistics Income Fun 7/18/2001 130.169 10 11900000 
CG CN Centerra Gold Inc 6/30/2004 282.238 15.5 16333900 
CAO CN Cadiscor Resources Inc 8/21/2006 4.3 1 4300000 
CAO CN Cadiscor Resources Inc 8/21/2006 2.299 1 4300000 
BTO CN B2Gold Corp 12/6/2007 100 2.5 40000000 
BIN CN Progressive Waste Solutions Lt 4/25/2002 193.218 10 17500000 
AXR CN Alexco Resource Corp 1/26/2006 3 1.5 2000000 
AVC CN American Vanadium Corp 9/24/2007 2.5 1 2500000 
ATS-U CN ATS Andlauer Income Fund 9/30/2005 93.242 10 9324200 
ARF CN Armtec Infrastructure Inc 7/27/2004 90.15 10 9015000 
AIN-U CN Arriscraft International Incom 12/14/2004 66.747 10 6674700 
AFN CN AG Growth International Inc 5/18/2004 74.04 10 6904000 
ADN CN Acadian Timber Corp 1/30/2006 85.9564 10 8450640 
9505429Q CN Peru Copper Inc 10/6/2004 56.5929 1.65 29825000 
8766167Q CN 
ART Advanced Research 
Technolo 6/29/2000 16.65 9 1850000 
8372702Q CN Athabasca Potash Inc 12/13/2007 49.5592 4.25 10140000 
8161730Q CN NewWest Gold Corp 8/29/2006 18.105 2.5 7050000 
4124028Q CN Sheffield Resources Ltd 3/11/1999 0.25 10 2500000 
3371363Q CN Vale Canada Ltd 5/11/1999 412.5 27.5 15000000 
2294981Q CN Prefco Enterprises Inc 4/17/2001 2.5 1 2500000 
0750327D CN Scandinavian Minerals Ltd 3/12/2004 4.91625 1.5 2850000 
0746636D CN Comnetix Inc 4/22/2004 7.2 1.8 4000000 
0682906D CN DDI Toronto Corp 9/26/2000 44 10 4400000 
0465270D CN Pan African Mining Corp 7/26/2004 6 1 5000000 





The following table shows the data used for calculating the short run performance: 
Issuer Ticker Close price of first trading 
day 
Index close price of first trading 
day 
Index close price before the 
first trading day 
0005744D CN 10.45 7851.47 7835.9 
0465270D CN 1 8314.55 8,383.30 
0682906D CN 9.7 10478.6 10631 
0746636D CN 1.75 8679.98 8573.05 
0750327D CN 1.9 8592.04 8503.88 
2294981Q CN 1.04 7819.06 7790.46 
3371363Q CN 25.3 7010.63 6997.13 
4124028Q CN 0.22 6565.75 6572.62 
8161730Q CN 2.5 12060.48 12167.35 
8372702Q CN 4.55 13747.25 13809.38 
8766167Q CN 8.2 10110.98 10231.33 
9505429Q CN 1.72 8871.93 8797.05 
ADN CN 10 11947.47 11,856.80 
AFN CN 10.08 8162.69 8123.5 
AIN-U CN 10.15 9086.36 9032.77 
ARF CN 10.06 8294.37 8314.55 
ATS-U CN 9.85 11011.83 11018.5 
AVC CN 1.55 13958.28 13,940.10 
AXR CN 1.9 11737.43 11675.16 
BIN CN 9.6 7686.29 7713.41 
BTO CN 2.4 13849.8 13734.54 
CAO CN 0.74 12136.93 12,044.80 
CAO CN 0.74 12136.93 12,044.80 
CG CN 15.4 8545.58 8498.52 
CHE-U CN 10.25 7620.47 7694.13 
CJT CN 10.15 9763.44 9707.88 
CMJ CN 1.5 13514.14 13440.72 
COP CN 2.22 14131.93 14177.52 
CSS CN 9.55 6161.08 6366.67 
CUM CN 2 13906.57 13715.67 
CUS CN 10 10391.3 10500.72 
DFE CN 7 13849.8 13734.54 
DGC CN 3.69 13034.12 13014.6 
DNK CN 7.7 10601 10813.1 
DPI-U CN 9.95 12119.83 12132.3 
DRX CN 8 7136.35 7154.44 
FBK CN 10.9 6550.71 6605.42 
FCC CN 1.88 9013.55 9003.74 
FMA/H CN 1.1 12145.1 12073.75 
FNV CN 15.2 13657.17 13,689.10 




GBY-U CN 10.2 9116.64 9106.16 
GDI CN 9.95 7663.85 7670.49 
GIF-U CN 9.91 8720.53 8788.9 
GNV CN 11 11653 11423.91 
GWW/H CN 1.98 14064.74 13,906.60 
HNZ/A CN 9.63 10898.2 10777.23 
IBG CN 10.3 8377.03 8309.04 
INV CN 1.22 12000.73 12085.65 
LH CN 10.36 13758.19 13560.57 
LIV-U CN 10.28 7604.51 7,535.40 
MCH CN 13.25 14295.86 14229.44 
MSV CN 1.25 10999.64 10824.14 
MTO CN 1.1 7956.18 7887.12 
MTP CN 1.1 8232.18 8241.49 
MUN CN 2.35 7822.34 7850.15 
NCF-U CN 9.9 10051.49 9939.2 
ND CN 2 14778.46 14602.59 
NIF-U CN 9.98 7663.85 7670.49 
OFB-U CN 9.8 10813.3 10668.94 
OGD CN 3.94 14292.14 14441.13 
OPM CN 4 9619.26 9639.59 
PBB-U CN 10 7706.98 7716.91 
PKL CN 1.05 14616.7 14666.07 
PLS CN 4.8 11565.21 11,620.50 
QUX CN 5.7 8833.48 8807.59 
RME CN 10.05 13407.01 13389.82 
SBR CN 2.75 13389.82 13358.07 
SCM CN 1.4 10681.18 10,678.70 
SDC CN 12.84 13966.33 14069.8 
SXP CN 10 12110.61 12206.95 
TBG CN 2.2 6583.77 6,633.40 
TFI CN 8.4 6180.42 6,111.10 
TL CN 2.4 10628.9 10684.72 
TMA CN 11.55 9741.37 9657.74 
TRK-U CN 10 11906.65 11,833.60 
TSL CN 9.76 6329.72 6293.86 
TVK CN 8.15 8473.18 8420.38 
UWE CN 2.5 12909.54 12852.59 
VNP CN 5.6 13407.01 13389.82 
WM CN 1.6 10867.07 10783.48 
WMK/H CN 7.8 13045.02 13040.11 
WPX CN 0.91 14414.3 14274.34 
XBC CN 1.74 9237.48 9176.94 
XOR CN 0.22 6560.62 6536.97 






Matching Firm Selection Procedure 
To select matching firms for my sample IPOs in 1999 to 2009, firms is 
selected by following standards: 
1) Firms were listed on the Canada’s some main exchanges, such as Toronto 
Stock exchange. 
2) We divided sample firms’ market capitalization into four levels: 1 million 
Canadian dollars (CAD) to 20 CAD, 20 CAD to 50 CAD, 50 CAD to 100 
CAD, and larger than 100 CAD. Then, select out the firms which is in the 
same level of market capitalization between the period of 1999 to 2009. 
3) Find out each matching firm’s stock price for 3 years, and calculate the 
monthly return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
